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Abstract

This paper is the second and final part of the overview of “Major Events and
Policy Issues in EC Competition law in 2004”, following from last month’s journal. This part of the paper is divided into three sections: (1) Recent Commission
decisions on cartels, co-operation, distribution and abuse of dominant position,
including notably the Microsoft decision; (2) an outline of current policy issues,
including possible extension of in-house privilege and possible Art.82 EC guidelines; (3) a survey of some areas of particular interest.Notably, the Commission’s
recent drive topromote cempetition in the liberal professions with a decision involving Belgian Architects; recent energy cases; and the Commission’s decision
on the sale of UEFA’s football media rights.
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This paper is the second and final part of the
overview of ‘‘Major Events and Policy Issues in EC
Competition law in 2004’’, following from last
month’s journal.1 This part of the paper is divided
into three sections:
(1) Recent Commission decisions on cartels,
co-operation, distribution and abuse of dominant position, including notably the Microsoft decision;
(2) an outline of current policy issues, including
possible extension of in-house privilege and
possible Art.82 EC guidelines;
(3) a survey of some areas of particular interest.
Notably, the Commission’s recent drive to promote competition in the liberal professions
with a decision involving Belgian Architects;
recent energy cases; and the Commission’s

There has not been quite the same level of fining
decisions this year as last. Two ‘‘old’’ decisions
which have been published this year merit some
comment: Austrian Banks and Methylglucamine.
Otherwise, there have been eight decisions announced, ranging in sector from copper tubes supply to architects’ services and tobacco purchasing.
It is proposed to outline the new cases first and then
point out some aspects of the ‘‘old’’ decisions. The
Belgian architects case is discussed in the section
on areas of particular interest below, together with
the Commission’s recent action on competition and
the liberal professions.
It may be useful to note at the outset there is now
no ‘‘cartel unit’’ as such. Rather, enforcement of
Art.81 EC, including cartels, has been reorganised
on an industry basis within DG COMP (as was the
case some years ago).
The Commission also now publishes (i) press
releases; (ii) short case summaries (in the EC Official
Journal); and (iii) full decisions in the language of the
case and the official Commission languages on its
website. This appears to be a result of the new Enlargement, bringing yet more languages into the EU.
Those concerned with worldwide cartels should
also be aware that the US rules have changed to
allow an amnesty applicant to limit its exposure to
single instead of treble damages under certain conditions.2

Table 1
Carbon and graphite products:
Organic peroxides:
Industrial tubes:
Belgian architects:
Copper plumbing tubes:
French beer:
Spanish raw tobacco:
Needles and haberdashery:

Total Fines
e101
e70
e79
e0.1
e222.3
e2.5
e20
e60
e554.9

Highest fines(s)
Carbone Lorraine was fined e43.05
Atofina was fined e43.47
KME Group companies fined a total of e39.81
KME Group companies fined a total of e67.08
Danone e1.5
Deltafina e11.88
Coats and Prym e30 each
(All figures are e million)

N.B. — Credit for evidentiary contribution outside leniency (2002 Notice principle applied in 1996 Notice cases
also).
— Issue of responses to requests for information in Austrian Banks decision also.
— ‘‘Treuhand’’ consultant firm fined in Organic Peroxides.

* With many thanks to Ingrid Cloosterin, Flavia Distefano
and Fiona Shotter for their general help in the production
of this paper and Elisabeth Arsenidou for her drafting
assistance in many sections. This is a slightly revised version
of a presentation given at the IBC Advanced Competition
Law Conference, Brussels, November 2004. The reference
period is from November 2003 until October 2004.
1. [2005] I.C.C.L.R. 47



2. See, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr Antitrust
and Competition Law Update, June 2004 available at
wilmerhale.com.
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Carbon and graphite products
In December 2003, the Commission imposed fines
of some e101 million on five companies for operating a cartel in the market for electrical and mechanical carbon and graphite products. Electrical
carbon and graphite products are used mainly to
transfer electricity to and in electrical motors.3
Mechanical carbon and graphite products are used
to seal gases and liquids in vessels and to keep lowwear parts in machines lubricated.
The EEA-wide market for such products was
found to be worth some e291 million in 1998, the
last year of the infringement (interestingly, here the
Commission identified the market as including the
value of captive use). The infringement was treated
as ‘‘very serious’’.
The cartel operated between October 1988 and
December 1999. During this period the companies,
which were found to control 93 per cent of the
European market, held more than 140 meetings to
decide price increases for a broad range of products,
as well as for large individual customers.
Although during the same period some of the
companies were participating in two other cartels,
graphite electrodes and speciality graphite, which
have also been found and punished, the fines imposed were not increased for this, because the
collusive behaviour was broadly contemporaneous.
The Commission reduced the fine that would
otherwise have been imposed on SGL by 33 per
cent, because it had already imposed high fines on
SGL in the previous two cartels and because the
undertaking was in a difficult financial situation
(although the Commission did not otherwise accept SGL’s submission on inability to pay).
The fines, after reductions for co-operation in
most cases, ranged from e43 million on Le Carbone
Lorraine to e1 million on Conradty Nürnberg, with
Morgan Crucible receiving full immunity for having been the first company to report the cartel to the
Commission.
Organic peroxides
In December 2003, the Commission imposed fines
of nearly e70 million on five companies for operating a cartel in the market for organic peroxides,
chemicals used in the plastic and rubber industries.4
The Commission found that the cartel operated
between 1971 and the end of 1999. With a total
duration of 29 years, this made it the longest-lasting
cartel with which the Commission has dealt so far.
The cartel involved price-fixing and market-sharing
in an EEA market worth some e250 million a year.
The Commission found this to be a ‘‘very serious’’
infringement. The fines ranged from e43.47 million
on Atofina to e1,000 on AC Treuhand, a Swiss
3. IP/03/1651, December 3, 2003; O.J. L125/45, April 28,
2004 (summary).
4. IP/03/1700, December 10, 2003.



consultancy company involved in the cartel administration.
The fines for Atofina, Laporte (now Degussa UK
Holdings) and Peroxid Chemie were increased significantly for recidivism. Akzo was given full immunity (under the 1996 Leniency Notice) because it
was the first to approach the Commission in early
2000 with decisive information on the cartel.
The decision to fine AC Treuhand is interesting,
because normally such third-party service providers have not been penalised. Here, AC Treuhand
is reported to have organised meetings, produced
market share papers and reimbursed the travel
expenses of participants to avoid leaving traces of
illegal meetings, suggesting that its involvement
went unusually far.
Industrial tubes
In December 2003, the Commission imposed fines
totalling some e79 million on three companies for
operating a cartel in relation to the supply of industrial copper tubes for air-conditioning and refrigeration.5 The cartel was found to have involved
allocation of markets and the setting of price targets
and increases and other commercial terms in the
framework of the Cuproclima Quality Association.
The cartel was operated between May 1988 and
March 2001 in a market that the Commission estimated to be worth e290 million in 2000 (although
the companies argue that much of that was just the
cost of metal, which was not part of their unlawful
co-operation, since its price was established on the
London Metal Exchange).
The fines, after reductions for co-operation,
ranged from e39.8 million on the companies now
in the KME group to e18 million on Outokumpu.
Outokumpu’s fine was increased for recidivism,
relying controversially on a decision under the ECSC
Treaty related to stainless steel cold-rolled products. This is the subject of an appeal (as is the metal
turnover aspect of the decision).
Mueller Industries was given full immunity for
having approached and co-operated with the Commission first.
Interestingly in the case, which came under the
1996 Leniency Notice, the Commission also applied the principle in the later 2002 Leniency
Notice, whereby a company’s fine may be reduced
for a specific evidentiary contribution. Here, in
addition to 50 per cent for leniency co-operation,
Outokumpu’s fine was reduced some further 20 per
cent for evidence disclosing the full duration of the
infringement.
Copper plumbing tubes
In September 2004, the Commission imposed fines
totalling some e222.3 million on some eight groups

5. IP/03/1746, December 16, 2003.
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of companies for operating a cartel in the European
market for copper water, heating and gas tubes.6
The cartel was found to have operated between
June 1988 and March 2001, in a market which the
Commission estimated to be worth some e1.15
billion in 2000. This was a similar infringement to
that involving industrial tubes and was contemporaneous with it, this time revolving around a quality
mark called SANCO.
Fines, after leniency, ranged from e67 million on
the companies now in the KME group to e9 million
on Halcor. Again Mueller Industries was granted
full immunity for having approached the Commission first. Outokumpu’s fine was again increased
for recidivism, based on the earlier ECSC infringement.
French beer
In September 2004, the Commission also imposed
small fines totalling e2.5 million on the two main
brewery groups in France: Danone/Brasseries
Kronenbourg S.A. and Heineken N.V., for having
agreed to ‘‘balance’’ the ‘‘Horeca’’ markets between
the two groups.7
It appears that a so-called ‘‘armistice’’ agreement
was entered into by the parties in 1996, after an
‘‘acquisition war’’ during which each group had
been buying up drinks wholesalers, leading to an
inflation in the acquisition costs of such wholesalers.
The companies are reported to have agreed to
bring an end to such rising costs and to ‘‘balance’’
their integrated distribution networks. This meant
that they agreed (a) to a temporary acquisition stop;
(b) to the ‘‘balancing’’ of the total volume of beer
distributed through the integrated network of each
party; and (c) to the ‘‘balancing’’ of the volume of
beer brands distributed by each party on behalf of
the other.
In setting the low fine, the Commission considered the infringement ‘‘serious’’ but took into
account that the agreement was never implemented. However, the fine on Danone/Brasseries
Kronenbourg was increased for recidivism (after
the Belgian beer case).
Spanish raw tobacco
In October 2004, the Commission imposed fines
totalling e20 million on five companies involved
in raw tobacco processing in Spain, together with
smaller fines of e1,000 on several tobacco growers’
associations.8
The processing companies were found to have
colluded on prices paid to and the quantities
bought from tobacco growers in Spain. In other
words, this involved a purchasing cartel, rather
6. IP/04/1065, September 3, 2004.
7. IP/04/1153, September 29, 2004.
8. IP/04/1256, October 20, 2004.

than a sales cartel. However, the tobacco growers
were found to have engaged in collective price
negotiations on their side also. They agreed on price
ranges and minimum prices for negotiation of ‘‘cultivation contracts’’ with processors.
The infringements took place between 1996 and
2001 and were considered to be ‘‘very serious’’
breaches in a market of relatively limited size (e25
million per year). Deltafina, a company active also
in Italy, was fined e11.8 million. The practices
appear to have been influenced by the agricultural
regulatory context, although the Commission states
that the conduct ‘‘cannot be imputed’’ to the Common Market Organisation for Raw Tobacco. It is a
little surprising to see a statement in the press
release that this was ‘‘very serious’’, given the
limited national scope and size of market.
Needles and haberdashery
In October 2004, the Commission announced that
it had fined two companies, Coats Holdings and
William Prym, e30 million each for operating a
cartel in the needle market and for segmenting the
European market for haberdashery products (needles, pins, buttons, fasteners and zips) between
September 1994 and the end of 1999.9 A third
company, Entaco Group Ltd, received full immunity for disclosing the cartel to the Commission. The
Commission states that Coats, one of the main
distributors of such products in Europe, forced
Entaco to enter into market-sharing with Prym at
manufacturing level in exchange for protection of
its own private label brand ‘‘Milward’’. This was
found to be a ‘‘very serious’’ infringement, in a
European market worth e1 billion in 2003. However, the cartel is said to have had limited impact.
Methylglucamine
The Commission published its decision in relation
to methylglucamine in February 2004.10 It may be
recalled that the case related to a price-fixing and
customer allocation agreement between RhônePoulenc Biochimie RPB (part of Aventis Pharma)
and Merck, found to have operated between 1990
and 1999.
Methylglucamine is a product which is mixed
with others to create a ‘‘contrast’’ agent used in
x-rays in medical applications. The market in question is quite small, some e3.1 million per year (at
least this was so in 1999).
The Commission granted Merck a 100 per cent
reduction for coming forward first and co-operating
under the 1996 Leniency Notice. RPB/Aventis were
fined e2.85 million after a 40 per cent reduction for
co-operation.

9. IP/04/1313, October 26, 2004.
10. O.J. L38/18, February 10, 2004. (The decision itself
was taken in November 2002, see [2004] I.C.C.L.R. 55.)
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On the decision, it appears that the Commission
relied much on Merck’s explanations and admissions from both companies. The Commission suggests that there were a series of price increases by
the two companies, generally after annual meetings
to review the last year’s performance. There was
some debate about when the cartel ended and
therefore who had been responsible for the termination. Ultimately, the Commission could not decide the issue and therefore took the last day for
validity of clearly agreed prices as the end. Again,
the Commission noted that proving the extent to
which prices differed as a result of a cartel is
extremely difficult, given the various factors which
may apply.11
On fines, while finding the infringement ‘‘very
serious’’, the Commission reducedthe basic amounts
considerably (to e2.5 million for each company)
because of the limited size of the product market.
The Commission increased the fine by 100 per cent
on Merck on the basis of deterrence (academically
because of the immunity granted), taking the view
that the addressees on the Aventis side were in fact
smaller than Merck (even though the Aventis group
itself was much bigger). There appears to have been
no increase for recidivism, even though RhônePoulenc had infringed before. There was a 90 per
cent increase for duration.
Aventis also sought mitigation of its fine for
having adopted a compliance programme. Unlike
the position some years ago, this was rejected by the
Commission. These days the credit given appears
only to be for results leading to termination and/or
leniency applications!12
Austrian banks
The Commission published its decision in the
‘‘Lombard Club’’ banking case in February 2004.13
It may be recalled that this was a decision relating
to an extensive, widely-known structure of committees which had operated in Austria for many
years.14 The Commission fined eight banks some
e124 million in June 2002. Various aspects of the
decision are interesting.
First, originally the co-ordination arrangements
concerned had been endorsed in law, apparently in
part because there was concern that there were poor
levels of profitability amongst the many banks in
Austria. There is also debate as to the extent to
which the authorities continued to be involved
informally, with the Commission noting that certain committees ‘‘quite central to this network were
not as a rule attended by the Austrian National
Bank’’ (emphasis added).15

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See para.231.
See para.260.
O.J. L56/1, February 25, 2004.
See, [2003] I.C.C.L.R. at p.62.
See para.496.

Secondly, the arrangements concerned agreements on various issues, notably interest rates for
lending and deposits, and advertising measures. In
particular, the Commission found that on occasion
the banks would react in concert to a reduction in
the National Bank’s key lending rates by lowering
deposit rates, without at the same time lowering
lending rates.
Thirdly, the Commission found that there was a
structure of committees dealing with different issues, with systems for higher level discussion and
ultimately a group at the top called the ‘‘Lombard
Club’’. The Commission also found that certain
banks represented not only themselves in such
committees, but also certain sectoral groupings
(e.g. savings banks).
Fourthly, the Commission discussed in its decision a period from 1994 to 1998. However, Austria
only joined the EU from 1995. Since the Commission’s right to intervene was not clear for 1994
(it was argued that only the EFTA Surveillance
Authority was competent) as regards activities in
the EEA, the Commission did not find an infringement for that year.16
Fifthly, there is extensive treatment of the issue
of effect on trade: the banks arguing, on Bagnasco
and the Dutch Banks cases, that the effects were
limited to Austria; the Commission arguing that
such a comprehensive arrangement clearly affected
trade.17 In addition, the Commission also set out
specific examples of the ways in which it considers
trade was affected, some appearing more directly
relevant than others. Thus, the Commission referred to cross-border payment transactions and
foreign banks seeking to enter the Austrian market.
However, the Commission also suggested that there
was indirect impact on investment and production
decisions of subsidiaries of foreign firms and Austrian firms in Austria, and that the ability of individuals to purchase imported consumer durables
such as cars from other countries might be affected.
Sixthly, the Commission’s approach to fining is
unusual. The Commission selected a number of the
larger banks, found to have played a more important role and, as noted, in some cases to have represented certain banking sectors. Fines were only
imposed on these selected banks and appear to
have been increased on those with such ‘‘representative’’ roles.18 The infringement was also treated as
‘‘very serious’’ because of its ‘‘comprehensive and
institutionalised’’ nature and the relevance of banking services to the whole economy.19
Seventhly, there is extensive discussion about
the duty of companies to reply to requests for
information and the related issue as to whether, if
they give more than they have to, they should
16.
17.
18.
19.



See para.406.
See para.445 et seq.
See paras 516–519 and 538.
See paras 506–507.
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receive ‘‘co-operation credit’’ for so doing. As in
Graphite Electrodes, the Commission considered
that the banks were required to give the material
facts of their involvement in meetings, and existing
documents. (The Commission stated that here
it relied entirely on pre-existing documents.) The
banks argued that, insofar as this involves direct
admissions, they do not have to answer such requests and, if they do, it is a voluntary act deserving
a reduction in fine.20 The Commission also rejected
claims that a ‘‘joint exposition of the facts’’ had
clarified the case, arguing that it was more of a
defence document. In the end, the Commission
only reduced the fines by 10 per cent, because the
banks did not contest the facts set out in the Statement of Objections.

Co-operation
Table 2
—

Co-operation
* Austrian ARA/ARGEV
 Local collector exclusivity allowed, if
public tendering.
* Air France Alitalia
 Competitors required on key routes!
* ‘‘SOs’’ for Cartes Bancaires and VISA.
 NB. GCB notification had ‘‘lapsed’’.

—

Distribution
* Small fine on Topps for blocking parallel
trade in Pokémon stickers.
* Proposed commitment decision for Repsol
service station settlement.
 Considerable market opening proposed.
 N.B. Cumulative network effect and high
market share.

Horizontal co-operation
There have been few full Commission decisions
this year on horizontal co-operation. However, the
Commission has published its decisions on the
German Network Sharing Agreement between O2
and T-Mobile21 and the Reims II postal co-operation
case.22 These have been outlined before.23
National recycling schemes
The Commission has also published its decision
clearing the Austrian ‘‘ARA’’ system for collection
and recovery of packaging waste.24 This system is
operated by ARA (‘‘Altstoff Recycling Austria’’)
with various other companies. It may be recalled
that in 2002, the Commission had published a

20. See paras 485 et seq. and paras 544 et seq.
21. O.J. L75/32, March 12, 2004.
22. O.J. L56/76, February 24, 2004. See, Gabathuler and
Sauter, EC Commission Competition Policy Newsletter,
Autumn 2003, p.43.
23. See, [2004] I.C.C.L.R. at p.61 and p.63.
24. O.J. L75/59, March 12, 2004.



rather complex Art.19(3) Notice indicating that it
planned to grant negative clearance or exemption
‘‘possibly with conditions’’ to the Austrian system.25
Companies active in transport and sales packaging, which are obliged by Austrian law to take
back any packaging they put into circulation and
provide for a suitable disposal, can adhere to ARA,
which is the main system for collection and recovery of packaging waste in Austria. They have to pay
a ‘‘licence fee’’ and thereby also acquire the right to
fix the ‘‘Green Dot’’ mark to their packaging. ARA
has entered into ‘‘waste disposal contracts’’ with
eight sectoral undertakings (called ‘‘branch’’ recycling companies, ‘‘BRGs’’) covering all sorts of packaging material for the entire Austrian territory. Each
of these BRGs organises the collection and/or recycling of a specific type of packaging material (e.g.
metal packaging, wood and ceramics, plastic and
textile fibres, paper and cardboard, and glass). The
BRGs do not carry out all of these tasks themselves,
but contract with sectoral recycling companies and
regional collection and sorting partners.
Various undertakings were given to ensure that
the ‘‘Green Dot’’ system does not prevent free movement of goods26 (as in other cases). Otherwise, in its
2002 Notice, the Commission had appeared concerned to promote competition at the regional
collection level, by giving collectors, which are
currently outside the ARA system, sufficient opportunity to compete for ARA business (under the
ARA system there is just one regional partner per
collection region).
Subsequently, in its 2003 decision, the Commission found that the exclusivity clauses binding
BRGs to one collector (but not also the collectors
to BRGs) per region for a five-year period infringed
Art.81(1) EC, because they hindered market entry
by other domestic and foreign collectors, which
were not participating in the ARA system.
The Commission granted an Art.81(3) EC exemption, after finding that the existing network effects
created by engaging only one collector per region
lead to efficiency gains through economies of scale
and scope.27 Furthermore, it estimated that the
relevant cost savings would be passed on to consumers on the market for the packaged products.
It considered that three-year exclusivity could be
accepted to allow the recycling companies to recover the substantial investments necessary to
build up the collection infrastructure, while it
was guaranteed that, after five years at the latest,
new contracts would be awarded via tendering
in a competitive, transparent and objective procedure.28

25.
26.
27.
28.

O.J. C252/2, October 19, 2002, [2003] I.C.C.L.R. 88.
See para.139.
See paras 160, 270, 272.
See paras 139, 277.
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Interestingly, therefore, the Commission is accepting competition by tender for disposal area
contracts at the latest every five years as sufficient
residual competition for the fourth requirement of
Art.81(3) EC,29 acknowledging that it would be almost impossible in practice and in economic terms
to duplicate collection infrastructure in the household sector across the whole of Austria.
The Commission granted an exemption from
June 20, 1994 to December 31, 2006, on condition
that BRGs in the ARA system would not hinder the
shared use of collection facilities. Further, that the
BRGs in the ARA system could only require disposal firms to provide evidence of packaging quantities corresponding to ARA’s share of the total
packaging licensed by recovery systems (the BRGs
contested these obligations as impractical and unreasonable).30 These obligations were considered
necessary to safeguard access to the disposal infrastructure and, accordingly, competition on the market for collection and recovery of packaging waste.31
The exemption does not apply to ARA’s charges
system and any possible related cross-subsidising
issue. The focus is rather on the underlying ‘‘macro’’
structure of such waste collection systems. The
Commission also expressly noted that the decision
is without prejudice to the application of Art.82 EC.
Air transport
In December 2003, the Commission cleared the
alliance between British Airways, Iberia and GB
Airways, a franchisee of British Airways.32 The
agreement, which was notified in July 2002 under
Regulation 3975/87 enables the parties to cooperate in terms of pricing, scheduling and capacity. It was cleared after certain Commission concerns were met. Notably, the parties agreed to give
up enough slots to enable one competitor to operate
four daily services between London Gatwick and
Madrid, and one further daily service between
London Gatwick and Bilbao. The parties also
undertook to surrender sufficient slots for one daily
service out of Gatwick to Seville and for another to
Valencia, if and when the number of business
passengers increases to a defined level.
In December 2003, the Commission also published information on remedies proposed by Air
France and Alitalia for their bilateral alliance.33
Then, in April 2004, the Commission announced
a decision clearing the alliance agreement between
Air France and Alitalia.34
The two companies entered into a co-operation
agreement in 2001, with the aim of creating a
29. See paras 278 et seq.
30. See paras 288 et seq.
31. See paras 288 et seq.
32. IP/03/1703, December 10, 2003.
33. IP/03/1676, December 9, 2003; O.J. C297/10, December 9, 2003.
34. IP/04/469, April 7, 2004.



European ‘‘multi-hub system’’ based on their main
airports of Paris Charles de Gaulle, Rome Fiumicino,
and Milan Malpensa. The agreements involve,
amongst other things, agreements on prices and
the sharing of earnings on routes between France
and Italy (and general network co-operation on
pricing, scheduling and capacity). The companies
notified the agreement to the Commission in November 2001 for exemption.
In general, the Commission was favourable (as in
other recent alliance cases), recognising that consolidation is required in the European airline
sector, that the two airlines had mainly complementary networks, that the alliance agreement improved connectivity, and that the co-operation
created cost savings and synergies for the parties.
However, as in other cases, the Commission has
structural concerns over overlapping route services.
Thus, the Commission identified seven routes where
the combination of Air France and Alitalia would
eliminate or significantly reduce competition (ParisMilan, Paris-Rome, Paris-Venice, Paris-Florence,
Paris-Bologna, Paris-Naples and Milan-Lyon) because, prior to the alliance, the two companies were
the main competitors on these routes. After discussions, the two airlines agreed to mechanisms to
‘‘surrender’’ up to 42 pairs of slots per day, which
would allow some 21 return flights.
The idea was that a new entrant would apply for
slots under the existing IATA slot allocation system. If it cannot obtain them, then a new entrant can
turn to the parties and seek slots, which the parties
agreed to make available up to certain limits, at
certain times and under conditions. The Commission will also be involved in the process, notably in
assessing whether the new entrant is a sufficiently
viable long-term competitor. The parties also agreed
not to add new frequencies on a route where there
was a new entrant for two years (save in exceptional
circumstances).
Otherwise, the parties agreed to enter into interlining agreements with a new entrant, to ‘‘host’’ the
new entrant in their frequent flyer programmes if
required, and also agreed to enter into inter-modal
passenger agreements at the request of rail or other
surface or sea transport companies, to widen transport choices.
In announcing its decision, the Commission
stated that, in practice, Air France and Alitalia
might not have to surrender as many slots as foreseen, because slots had become available through
the bankruptcies of airlines holding slots at Orly.
Companies such as Volare, Easyjet and Meridiana
were therefore offering services. However, the
Commission added that if any actual competitor
were to exit the market, Air France and Alitalia
would have to make its slots available to other rivals
in order to restore the level of competition sought by
this decision.
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As with the Austrian Airlines/Lufthansa decision, it appears therefore that the Commission is
taking the ongoing maintenance of competition
seriously in its remedies in this sector. The clearance was granted for six years from November 12,
2001.
Credit card systems
In July 2004, the Commission sent a Statement of
Objections to nine major banks and to the French
Groupement des Cartes Bancaires ‘‘GCB’’.35 The
objections relate to an alleged agreement on bank
payment cards by means of which the banks, with
the help of Groupement des Cartes Bancaires, are
alleged to have shared out the market for the issue of
CB cards in France in order to restrict competition
from new entrants, such as banking arms of large
retailers and medium-sized banks.
At the end of 2002, GCB, an economic interest
grouping under French law comprising some 155
banks, notified the Commission on behalf of its
members of the introduction of new, higher, complex charges payable to GCB by banks issuing CB
cards.
The Commission appears to have formed the
view that the notified agreements stemmed from a
secret agreement to foreclose the market to new
entrants and stated that it found evidence thereof,
during inspections in May 2003 on the premises of
GCB and of certain banks.
It is alleged that the tariffs adopted by GCB raised
new entrance charges for CB cards and forced them
to scale down their card-issuing projects considerably. Interestingly, the Commission specifically
suggests that the agreement increased their costs
by up to e23 per card and per year, and that this
charge was passed on to consumers. Moreover, it is
alleged that the banks party to the agreement were
spared the new charges, and benefited from them,
since the charges paid by new entrants accrued to
them.
This appears to be an interesting ‘‘Regulation 1/
2003 development’’ since, from May 1, 2004, presumably GCB’s notification expired and it therefore
no longer has immunity from fines. It will be interesting to see whether the case develops further or
the banks adequately explain what was going on.
In August 2004, the Commission also sent VISA a
Statement of Objections36 concerning a rule in the
Visa International by-laws according to which the
VISA International Board shall not accept for membership any applicant deemed by the Board to be
a competitor of VISA. The Commission was concerned that this rule has not been applied in an
objective and non-discriminatory manner vis-à-vis
all applicants for VISA membership. Notably, it
appears that in April 2000 Morgan Stanley Dean
35. IP/04/876, July 8, 2004.
36. IP/04/1016, August 3, 2004.



Witter complained that it was denied VISA membership, apparently because it operates the ‘‘Discover’’ brand credit card, while others, such as
Citigroup (which owns Diners Club), some Japanese
banks (which are shareholders in the JCB system)
and Cetelem (which operates the Aurora payment
card network) are allowed. The Commission also
notes that Mastercard does not operate a similar
rule. There have been investigations on similar
issues before.37
According to the Commission’s preliminary
assessment, this VISA rule implies that potential
entrants would not be able to operate on the VISA
network anywhere in the EEA, restricting competition for merchant acquiring. In addition, being
refused VISA membership is thought to prevent
potential new entrants from engaging in crossborder acquiring.38
Collective licensing of music copyrights
On May 3, 2004, the Commission sent a Statement
of Objections to 16 organisations which collect
royalties on behalf of music authors, stating that
their co-operation agreement (known as the ‘‘Santiago Agreement’’) was potentially contrary to the
EC competition rules.39
The Commission stated that the cross-licensing
arrangements which the collecting societies have
between themselves lead to an effective lock-up of
national territories, transposing into the internet
the national monopolies which the societies traditionally have held otherwise. The Santiago Agreement was notified in April 2001. Then, it was stated
that the purpose of the agreement is to allow each of
the participating societies to grant to online commercial users ‘‘one-stop-shop’’ copyright licences,
which include the music repertoires of all societies
and which are valid in all their territories.
While supportive of that purpose, the Commission considered that the structure put in place by
the parties results in commercial users being limited in their choice to the monopolistic collecting
society established in their own Member State. The
Commission considered that the developments in
online activities should be accompanied by an
increasing freedom of choice by consumers and
commercial users throughout Europe as regards
their service providers. Notably, the Commission
considered that the territorial exclusivity afforded
by the Santiago Agreement to each of the participating societies was not justified by technical reasons
37. See [1997] I.C.C.L.R. 41.
38. In May 2004, the Commission also issued a Press
Release welcoming VISA and Mastercard’s decisions to
publish their multilateral interchange fee rates for European cross-border payments on their respective websites,
after discussions with the Commission on the issue. It
appears that retailers have been complaining that banks
are reluctant to give them the information. IP/04/616,
May 7, 2004.
39. IP/04/586, May 3, 2004.
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and is irreconcilable with the worldwide reach of
the internet. It also noted that territorial exclusivity
was not required in the IFPI Simulcasting Agreement which the Commission exempted in 2002.40
The date of this Statement of Objections suggests
that this is another ‘‘Regulation 1/2003 development’’ since the societies’ notification has now
lapsed.41 Again, this is only a preliminary phase
and we will have to see how the societies justify the
territorial provisions in the circumstances.
Telenor Canal+
In January 2004, the Commission announced in a
short press release that it exempted for five years
certain exclusive distribution agreements between
Telenor and Canal+ Nordic, under which Telenor
will have the exclusive right to distribute Canal+
Nordic’s premium pay-TV channels in the Nordic
region through its satellite television platform
Canal Digital.42
The agreements were concluded in 2001, in
order to guarantee continuity of pay-TV service
after Telenor acquired the remaining 50 per cent
shareholding in Canal Digital from Canal+ Nordic.
Previously Canal Digital was a joint venture between Canal+ Nordic and Telenor. The agreements
as initially notified included a long-term exclusivity, which the Commission considered anticompetitive. The Commission stated that it decided to exempt the co-operation after the parties
agreed to limit the exclusivity to a shorter period.
The Commission noted the presence of a second
satellite pay-TV distributor in the Nordic region,
MTG/Viasat, and that consumers would have available two distinct pay-TV brands at competitive
prices.

Distribution
Porsche
In May 2004, the Commission cleared Porsche’s
new distribution and after-sales network, after
Porsche committed to revise its agreements so as
to comply with the new Motor Vehicle Block
Exemption (‘‘MVBE’’).43 Porsche has opted for a
selective distribution system, as have almost all
the other car manufacturers.
As regards Porsche’s distribution network, dealers are now free to provide after-sales services
40. O.J. L107/58, April 30, 2003 and [2003] I.C.C.L.R. 89.
41. In November 2003, the Commission also published
a notice inviting comments concerning the Cannes Extension Agreement on the administration of phonomechanical rights in Europe, O.J. C282/14, November 25,
2003.
42. IP/04/2, January 5, 2004, see also [2004] I.C.C.L.R. 61
and Nehl EC Commission Competition Policy Newsletter,
Summer 2004 at p.56.
43. IP/04/585, May 3, 2004. With thanks to Flavia Distefano for her assistance.



directly, or to sub-contract them to an authorised
Porsche service centre.
The Commission found that the network is ‘‘de
minimis’’, as Porsche’s market shares in the relevant markets for car distribution are below five per
cent in each EU Member State. As a result, Porsche
is allowed to include certain restrictive clauses listed
in Art.5 of the MVBE, as not appreciable in the
specific circumstances and outside Art.81(1) EC.44
In particular, Porsche is allowed to impose a ‘‘noncompete’’ clause requiring dealers to sell competing car brands through separate showrooms and
sales personnel, as well as to prohibit dealers from
opening secondary outlets even beyond October 1,
2005 (when such ‘‘location clauses’’ generally will
not be capable of exemption under the MVBE).
As concerns its after-sales network, Porsche
could only opt for a qualitative selective system,
as it has more than 30 per cent of the Porsche car
repair market. Based on this system, the Porsche
official network is now open to any independent
repairers who fulfil the required qualitative criteria.
However, Porsche service centres are not allowed to sell competing brands of sports cars and
sport utility vehicles, such as Aston Martin, Audi,
BMW, Jaguar, Lamborghini, Land Rover, Mercedes
or Volkswagen (Touareg). The Commission authorised this non-compete clause, as it found that it only
affects some eight per cent of operators in the car
business and therefore the Commission considered
that it was not an appreciable restriction on the
market for the repair of Porsche cars. Moreover, the
restriction did not apply to Porsche dealers who
may also have a repair workshop or to independent
or authorised car repairers.
Pokémon stickers and cards
In May 2004, the Commission fined Topps, a group
of companies which produce Pokémon stickers
and cards, some e1.6 million for seeking to prevent
imports from low-price to high-price countries for
cards and sweets bearing the image of Pokémon
cartoon characters.45
The Commission has found that Topps entered
into a series of agreements and/or concerted practices with several of its distributors in the United
Kingdom, Italy, Finland, Germany, France and
Spain with the objective of preventing parallel
imports. It appears that in 2000, Topps charged its
distributors up to 243 per cent more in Finland than
in Portugal. The EEA market was estimated to be
worth e600 million in 2000. Distributors which
would not trace back parallel imports and monitor

44. See the Explanatory Brochure to the MVBE (‘‘Distribution and Servicing of Motor Vehicles in the European
Union’’) of July 2002, Commission response to Question 7,
at p.23.
45. IP/04/682, May 26, 2004.
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the final destination of the products were threatened with supply cuts.
The Commission states that it set the overall fine
at (only) some e1.6 million, taking into consideration the short duration of the infringement and the
fact that it was terminated immediately after receipt
of a warning.
Repsol
In October 2004, the Commission published an
‘‘Art.27(4)’’ Notice in relation to Repsol’s motor
fuel distribution practices through service stations
situated in Spain.46 This is another ‘‘Regulation 1/
2003 development’’, insofar as it is a notice indicating that, subject to market testing, the Commission
is planning to take a decision declaring commitments binding under Art.9 of Regulation 1 and
inviting comments on such proposed action.
After notification of agreements and model contracts by Repsol in December 2001, the Commission
found in March 2002 that Repsol’s distribution
practices involving non-compete clauses for the
party to the agreement which operates at the lowest
level of the distribution chain, could fall within the
scope of Regulation 17 and invited interested parties to submit their possible observations.47 Then,
in June 2004, the Commission decided to initiate
proceedings with a view to adopting a decision
pursuant to Art.9 of Regulation 1/2003.
The notified agreements concern the exclusive
purchase of fuel by service station operators in
Spain and are of eight different categories depending on the type of tenure of the service station and
on the nature of the commercial relationship between Repsol and the service station operator.
Repsol was found to have market shares ranging
between 35 per cent and 50 per cent on the fuel
wholesale markets for petrol and diesel in Spain,
and similar shares on downstream market for retailing of fuel in Spain.
The Commission considered three issues: (a) the
distinction between agent and retailer in EC competition law, (b) clauses relating to the setting of a
maximum fuel retail price, and (c) non-compete
clauses for fuel, which might foreclose the market.
As regards agency issues, the Commission does
not appear to have concluded whether the agents
are independent traders or not (in terms of taking
commercial or financial risk or not). However, the
Commission considered that, ‘‘whatever the agent’s
situation in the light of these criteria, the noncompete clauses ... may be problematic owing to
the effects on inter-brand competition’’,48 notably,
if they lead to market foreclosure. As regards

46. O.J. C258/7, October 20 2004, on ‘‘Article 9 commitments’’ see MEMO/04/217, September 17, 2004.
47. O.J. C70/29, March 19, 2002.
48. See para.17.



maximum pricing, the Commission was not concerned, since agents were free to grant discounts.
With regard to maximum prices, most of the
notified agreements prohibit service station operators from selling fuel at a price higher than the
maximum set by Repsol. On the other hand, operators are free to grant discounts. In some cases
Repsol simply recommended a retail price and
left it to the operators to set the actual price. Since
its investigation did not reveal any indications that
the setting of maximum prices might create significant alignment effects, there was nothing to suggest
a restriction of intra-brand competition.
As to the non-compete clauses, which only
cover fuel and not other products intended for
sale through service stations, the Commission
found that the agreements might facilitate significantly foreclosure on the fuel retail market in Spain.
Non-compete clauses were found in more than
2,500 agreements, mainly for a duration of some
five years. Where Repsol owned the outlet, the
‘‘usufruct’’ or tenancy arrangement included noncompetes ranging from 25 to 40 years.
Due to significant vertical integration of operators, cumulative effects of the parallel networks of
vertical restraints, and difficulties arising because
of the saturation of the market and the nature of the
product, the market was accessible only with difficulty by competitors.49 In this context the Commission considered that the tied share of Repsol’s sales
was some 25–35 per cent, the non-compete obligations were of substantial duration, and service
station operators and final customers were weak in
comparison with suppliers such as Repsol which
had a substantial market share.50
Repsol proposed the following commitments, to
remain valid until May 31, 2010:








To offer service station operators, with usufruct or tenancy rights with only some 12
years left to run, the option to ‘‘buy back’’
the right in rem before the scheduled expiry
of their agreements.
To observe a five-year maximum duration for
new fuel distribution agreements with operators where it is not the owner of the service
station concerned.
Not to buy existing service stations which are
not already tied to its network outright from
their operators until the end of 2006.
To advertise in advance the expiry of fuel
distribution agreements with service stations
and the option to terminate in advance agreements involving rights in rem via a communication to the Ministry of Economic Affairs
made public on the Ministry’s website.

49. See para.23.
50. See para.24.
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A third-party (auditor) to draw up annual
reports for the Commission to verify compliance by Repsol with the commitments.

The Commission has announced its intention to
adopt a commitment decision accepting these undertakings, finding that Repsol’s commitments provide a ‘‘practical response to its concerns about
the foreclosure effects on the Spanish market’’.
The Commission considered that the commitments
would increase the number of outlets open to
change supplier from 140–160 service stations per
year, to more than 400 per year. Agreement durations are also considerably shortened and a temporary restraint on Repsol’s vertical integration is
introduced. The Commission considered that this
gives new opportunities for competitors to attain
the minimum number of outlets necessary for the
economic operation of a distribution system in the
sector.
It is an interesting development because there is
a lot behind this, above all a cumulative network
foreclosure assessment in a case where the supplier
has high market share (i.e. is above the Vertical
Restraints Block Exemption ceilings).

Articles 82–86 EC
Table 3
—

Microsoft
* e497 million fine for:
(i) bundling of Windows and Media Player;
and
(ii) refusal to supply inoperability
specifications for server operating
systems.
* ‘‘Exceptional’’ grounds for disclosure even if
IP protected.
* Sophisticated 300-page decision (already
appealed).

—

Coca-Cola
* Proposed commitments on exclusivity,
rebates, tying and some cooler access.

Microsoft 51
In March 2004, the European Commission issued
its long awaited Microsoft decision, which has now
been published on its website.52 It is a mere 300
pages long! There is already an enormous amount of
discussion and literature on the case. Microsoft has

51. With thanks to Sven Voelcker and Antonio Capobianco for their assistance. See also Banasevic, Pena Castellot, Sitar, Piffaut, EC Commission Competition Policy
Newsletter, Summer 2004, pp.44–48; and IP/04/382 and
MEMO/04/70, March 24, 2004.
52. www.europa.cu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/
cases/decisions/37792/eu.pdf.



already appealed. The case concerns two main
issues:
(1) Microsoft’s tying of the Windows operating
system with the Windows Media Player.
(2) Microsoft’s withholding of interoperability
specifications for server operating systems.
As regards Microsoft’s tying of Windows to Media
Player, since 1999 Microsoft has licensed its successive versions of Windows operating systems
only in a bundle with its own Windows ‘‘Media
Player’’.53 The Commission found this to constitute
illegal tying under Art.82(d) EC. In the Commission’s view, this practice amounts to an abuse of
Microsoft’s dominant position in the PC operating
systems market. The Commission ordered Microsoft to unbundle the two products by making available to PC OEM manufacturers a version of its
operating systems that does not include Media
Player code.54
The Commission concluded that Microsoft holds
a dominant position in the PC operating systems
market:
‘‘A dominant position which exhibits extraordinary
features since it controls the quasi-standard of the
relevant market in question and has done so for some
time. Microsoft’s dominance relies on high market
shares and significant barriers to entry’’.55

The Commission also found that ‘‘streaming’’
media players constitute a market separate from
PC operating systems. To support this finding,
the Commission relied, among other things, on
evidence of demand for streaming media players
separate from operating systems (mostly through
free internet downloads), as well as the existence of
specialised media player vendors such as Real
Networks (RealPlayer) and Apple (QuickTime).
The Commission rejected Microsoft’s argument
that there is no consumer demand for operating
systems without a media player. It found that,
without Microsoft’s bundling, PC OEMs could
meet consumer demand for a pre-installed media
player by supplying the operating system with a
media player other than Media Player.
Then, the Commission found that Microsoft’s
refusal to license its Windows operating system to
OEMs without Media Player constituted tying
within the meaning of Art.82(d) EC. In particular,
the Commission observed that, although OEMs
were free to install additional media player software, they were unable technically to un-install
Windows Media Player. It also rejected Microsoft’s
argument that Media Player is included in Windows without ‘‘extra charge’’, because (i) a charge

53. See paras 794 et seq. Previously, it had bundled the
Windows operating system with the media player developed by complainant Real Networks.
54. See paras 1011 et seq.
55. See paras 429 and 472.
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for Media Player might be ‘‘hidden’’ in the Windows/Media Player bundled price; and (ii) the
pricing issue was, in any event irrelevant to the
foreclosure concerns that drive the rules against
tying.
The Commission then undertook an extensive
analysis of the foreclosure effects of tying Media
Player to Windows. It found that, given the ubiquity
of Microsoft’s operating system, suppliers of other
media players cannot gain comparable access to
customers’ PCs. Although the Commission examined other distribution channels (e.g. internet downloading and OEM installation agreements), it
concluded that none could match the penetration
of the Windows operating system.
The Commission also found the ubiquity of
Media Player to create incentives for content providers and software developers to encode their
products using only Media Player technology. According to the Commission, the rapid growth of
Media Player to the detriment of competing media
players (measured, e.g. on the basis of player usage,
format usage, content offered by websites, installed
base) shows the exclusionary effects of Microsoft’s
practice. Elsewhere in the decision, the Commission also noted the potential ‘‘chilling effect’’ of
Media Player-style bundling on software developers seeking to develop additional functionalities,
whose markets would be pre-empted if Microsoft
decided to integrate comparable functions into
Windows.56
Finally, the Commission considered, but ultimately rejected, several ‘‘objective justifications’’
that Microsoft put forward. As to distribution efficiencies, the Commission noted that the same
efficiencies could be obtained if Microsoft offered
OEMs the choice whether to include Media Player
or another media player with PCs they ship. As to
possible efficiencies resulting from content and
applications developers being able to place calls
to Media Player’s application programming interfaces (‘‘API’’), the Commission also found that such
efficiencies could be realised without tying, i.e.
by OEMs deciding on their own to pre-install
Media Player if the latter offers the best functionality.
As regards Microsoft’s withholding of interoperability specifications, the Commission found that
Microsoft had infringed Art.82 EC by abusing its
dominance in the desktop and workgroup server
operating system markets57 in order to achieve and
maintain dominance in the latter market. The Commission found that Microsoft had refused to supply
Sun Microsystems and other rivals with the specifications for protocols that Windows workgroup
servers use.

56. See para.983.
57. See para.541.

By refusing to do so, Microsoft kept those companies from implementing such specifications to
develop fully interoperable workgroup server operating system products. As a remedy, the Commission ordered Microsoft to provide all interested
parties with the necessary interoperability specifications within 120 days on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms.58
The Commission found Microsoft dominant not
only in the market for PC operating systems, but
also in the market for workgroup server operating
systems, delivering file, print and group and user
administration services in small to medium-sized
networks. Microsoft vigorously argued that there is
not a separate market for such a narrow category of
server operating systems (Microsoft has a much
weaker market position for other types of server
operating systems, in particular for high-end servers). The company argued that the same operating
systems could be used for all types of servers,
regardless of what tasks the servers performed,
and that operating systems for higher-end types of
servers could easily be ‘‘slimmed down’’ to be sold
as workgroup server operating systems.
The Commission responded that Microsoft itself
offers a differentiated range of server operating
systems for different tasks at significantly different
prices. Moreover, it found that due to their frequent
interaction with client PCs, workgroup server operating systems require a higher degree of interoperability than operating systems for other types
of servers and are thus not substitutable by other
types of servers. This also led the Commission to
conclude that competitors could not easily ‘‘scale
down’’ operating systems originally designed for
higher-end servers, since those usually do not offer
the same degree of interoperability with client PCs
as workgroup servers do.
In the market for workgroup server operating
systems, the Commission estimated that Microsoft’s market share exceeds 60 per cent. In addition,
it emphasised the close links with the market for PC
operating systems due to interoperability requirements. Referring in particular to the Tetra Pak II
judgment, it inferred from those links that Microsoft should be considered dominant in both markets. Nevertheless, it appears that the Commission
links Microsoft’s abusive behaviour primarily to its
dominance in the market for PC operating systems.
The Commission found that Microsoft had
abused its dominant position by refusing to supply
specifications for both client-to-server and serverto-server protocols that would enable competing
server operating systems software to fully operate
with the Windows domain architecture.59
The Commission reached this conclusion despite its explicit recognition that disclosure of the
58. See paras 999 et seq.
59. See paras 546 et seq. and 779–784.
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relevant protocols could impinge on Microsoft’s
intellectual property rights. Although recognising
that refusals to license intellectual property can
constitute an abuse only in exceptional circumstances, the Commission refused to be bound by
an ‘‘exhaustive checklist’’ of such circumstances as
set out in Magill60 or other judgments by the European Court.
Here, the Commission found the following facts
to constitute exceptional circumstances justifying
the finding of an abuse.61








First, Microsoft’s refusal to disclose protocol
specifications amounted to a disruption of
‘‘previous levels of supply’’. In particular, the
Commission found that Microsoft made such
disclosures before it had a credible server
operating systems offering, but deliberately
discontinued them after it developed one, in
order to disadvantage its rivals.
Secondly, Microsoft’s refusal to disclose protocol specifications risked eliminating competition in the workgroup server operating
systems market, as demonstrated by Microsoft’s ‘‘rapid rise to dominance’’ in that market.
Thirdly, the Commission emphasised that
interoperability disclosures were indispensable for rivals to compete, and that open
industry standards supported in Windows,
the distribution of client-side software by the
server operating systems vendor, or reverse
engineering of Microsoft’s products, provided no viable substitute.
Fourthly, the Commission found that Microsoft’s conduct was not justified by the protection of its intellectual property rights. ‘‘On
balance’’, any disincentives for future innovation by Microsoft resulting from the compulsory disclosure of such IP rights would be
outweighed by the substantial promotion of
competitive innovation in the market as a
whole.62 The Commission repeatedly pointed
out that it was not requiring Microsoft to
disclose the actual source code of its operating systems, but only the specifications
necessary to ensure interoperability.

The Commission also fined Microsoft e497 million, a huge sum in EC terms.
Clearstream
In June 2004, the Commission adopted a decision
against Clearstream International,63 having sent a
Statement of Objections in March 2003 alleging
60. Joined cases C–241/91P and C–242/91P, RTE and ITP
v Commission [1995] E.C.R., I-743.
61. See paras 578 et seq.
62. See paras 709 et seq. especially at para.783.
63. IP/04/705, June 2, 2004, see also Martinez Rivero and
Buftan, EC Commission Competition Policy Newsletter,
Summer 2004, p.49.



abuse of dominance.64 In its decision, the Commission identified two types of abuse: refusal to supply
and discriminatory pricing.
The Commission noted that Clearstream was the
only ‘‘final custodian of German securities kept in
collective safe custody’’, and that Clearstream was
an unavoidable trading partner for intermediaries
seeking clearing and settlement services for the
registration of shares under German law. New market entry was unrealistic.
Consequently, by refusing Euroclear Bank SA
access to settlement services for German registered
shares for some two years, Clearstream had abused
its dominant position. The Commission also noted
that Euroclear could not duplicate the services that
it was requesting, and that the refusal had the effect
of impairing Euroclear’s ability to provide an efficient cross-border service in the downstream market for cross-border clearing and settlement of EU
securities.
The Commission found discrimination because
of the unreasonable delay with which Clearstream
eventually supplied Euroclear (two years) in comparison with other customers (four months). Moreover, by charging Euroclear a higher per transaction
price than other securities depositories outside
Germany in the years between 1997 and 2001,
Clearstream had also discriminated in its prices to
Euroclear.
By the time the Commission adopted its decision, the infringements had ceased. No fine was
imposed, because account was taken of the fact that
there was no EC case law dealing with the relevant
issues, and because clearing and settlement services in the EU are evolving, in particular as regards
cross-border transactions.65
Interbrew
Following last year’s settlement with regard to
Interbrew’s ‘‘tied house’’ purchasing system on
the retail level in Belgium,66 in April 2004, the
Commission closed a procedure concerning Interbrew’s rebate practices in relation to Belgian beer
wholesalers, after it had received a series of commitments.67 The Commission specifically stated
that Interbrew’s amended commercial practices
do not constitute an abuse of Interbrew’s alleged
dominant position on the Belgian beer market.
As regards its rebate system, Interbrew offers
standardised volume rebates based on the total
64. IP/03/462, March 31, 2003; [2004] I.C.C.L.R. 69.
65. The Commission has also published a study on current arrangements in the securities area, dealing with
clearing, central counterparties and securities settlement;
details are available on the Commission’s website at the
competition page. The main interest from the competition
perspective is that the Commission has said that it plans to
address (with NCAs) anti-competitive practices in the
sector and to monitor existing monopoly positions and
further industry consolidation.
66. IP/03/545, April 15, 2003; [2004] I.C.C.L.R. at 63.
67. IP/04/574, April 30, 2004.
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volume of each type of beer purchased by a wholesaler in a year, paying the rebate for each category of
beer. Rebates will be more transparent in the sense
that wholesalers will know the full rebate scale.
Wholesalers which sell Interbrew’s beer through
their own tied retail outlets also receive separate
rebates for each type of beer sold. However, these
will no longer increase as a function of the number
of the wholesalers’ tied outlets. Instead, they are
paid for fixed amounts of particular beers sold,
irrespective of the number of outlets.
Interbrew also has some ‘‘management support’’
partnership agreements with wholesalers. Interbrew will no longer have the pre-emption right to
buy the wholesaler’s business in the event of a
competitor’s bid. Moreover, it will no longer have
access to the wholesaler’s confidential business
data.
Interbrew also has commercial agreements with
wholesalers, according to which Interbrew grants
them incentives in return for promotional activities. In these agreements, Interbrew will abolish
product exclusivity requirements, make the eligibility criteria fully transparent and clarify that the
same incentives are open to all wholesalers.
Finally, Interbrew has terminated its distribution agreement with its competitor Haacht, according to which Interbrew beers have benefited
from exclusive access to retail outlets tied to
Haacht.
Interbrew agreed to introduce these changes by
December 31, 2004.
Proposed Coca–Cola Settlement
In September 2004, after a five-year investigation,
the Commission decided to initiate proceedings
with a view to adopting a commitment decision
pursuant to Art.9 of Regulation 1/2003 in relation to
Coca-Cola’s commercial practices in the EU. The
commitments from Coca-Cola were received in
October and are published on the Commission’s
website for third-party comments.68
These commitments establish rules which will
govern the practices of The Coca-Cola Company
and its bottlers, and are applicable to all sales of all
carbonated soft drinks under the Coca-Cola brand
destined for consumption in countries where CocaCola or its bottlers may be subject to Art.82 EC or
Art.54 of the EEA agreement. They concern the
take-home and on-premise channels, sponsorship
and public and private tender agreements and
technical equipment placement.
The main commitments proposed are as follows:


Coca-Cola customers will remain free to buy
and sell any third-party carbonated soft
drinks and will not be required to purchase
68. IP/04/1247, October 19, 2004; see also now the
Art.27(4) notice published at O.J. C289/10, November 26,
2004.















a specified minimum percentage of their total
requirements.
Coca-cola will offer no target or growth rebates and no tying provisions linking CocaCola branded cola or orange to other products
in its range.
Where Coca-Cola agreements include shelf
space commitments, these will be nonexclusive and defined separately for Cola
and orange carbonated soft drinks.
Where Coca-Cola sponsors venues, it will
not require that non-Coca-Cola branded soft
drinks will not be available in the venue,
other than in respect of the sponsoring brands
or flavour categories.
Where Coca-Cola sponsors limited duration
events, exclusive supply rights for the full
range of Coca-Cola’s soft drinks may be
linked to the sponsorship agreement, provided that the event does not exceed 60
days per year.
However, Coca-Cola may compete for and
enter into public tender agreements containing exclusive beverage supply rights.
The same applies for private tender agreements, provided that they are limited to a
maximum of five years and give the customer
an annual option to terminate the agreement
without penalty after an initial term not exceeding three years.

There are particular provisions as regards ‘‘coolers’’/vending machines:








Where Coca-Cola provides a beverage cooler
on a rent-free basis and the customer does not
have any other installed chilled beverage
capacity to which the consumer has direct
access, the customer will be free to use at least
20 per cent of that cooler’s capacity for any
products of its choosing.
Where the cooler is being provided in exchange for rental payments, the customer
will also be free to stock any products of its
choosing in at least 20 per cent of the cooler’s
capacity.
If the customer has purchased the cooler from
Coca-Cola or a manufacturer to which CocaCola refers the customer, it will be free to
stock the cooler with any products of its
choosing.
Furthermore, Coca-Cola will not require customers to refrain from placing competing
fountain dispensers or packaged carbonated
soft drinks on any premises, while purchase
commitments for products sold through
fountain dispensers will not exceed three
years and customers will have the option to
terminate such commitments without penalty with effect at any time following an
initial term not exceeding three years.

[2005] I.C.C.L.R., ISSUE 3 c SWEET & MAXWELL LIMITED [AND CONTRIBUTORS]

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

122 RATLIFF: MAJOR EVENTS AND POLICY ISSUES IN EC COMPETITION LAW, 2003–2004 (PART 2): [2005] I.C.C.L.R.



No agreement under which Coca-Cola provides vending machines will require that the
customer refrains from placing competing
vending machines on any premises.

This is almost an anti-climactic proposed settlement, since many had expected a major fight. We
will have to see what the final decision looks like.
However, thus far, it is interesting to see that the
Commission appears to be requiring unbundling
within a product family. If so, that is a new development. Equally, dominant companies may be
encouraged to see the Commission allowing exclusivity for specific contexts, such as sponsorship
and in the context of tenders.
The ‘‘Coca-Cola companies’’ concerned propose
to apply the commitments throughout the EU,
Norway and Iceland insofar as Coca-Cola branded
carbonated soft drinks (‘‘CSD’’) accounted, in the
year, for more than 40 per cent and more than twice
the share of the nearest competitor of national CSD
sales in either the take-home or on-premises sales
channel.
Telecoms issues
In December 2003, the Commission issued a Statement of Objections to Telia Sonera (‘‘TS’’) alleging
that TS had abused its dominant position in the
markets for the provision of local broadband infrastructure and the provision of high-speed internet
access, by intentionally bidding below cost for the
construction and operation of such a network for
HSB Malmö, a regional housing association.69 It
appears that in October 1999, Telia, which was
not yet merged with Sonera and owned approximately 90 per cent of the local infrastructure susceptible to be used for the provision of high-speed
internet access, won a bid for a contract with HSB
Malmö, the second largest co-operative housing
association in Sweden, to construct a new fibreoptic network and provide broadband services to
households in the Malmö region exclusively for
five years. A competitor, B2 Bredband AB, complained.
In March 2004, the Commission terminated its
investigation of alleged abusive margin squeezing
by Deutsche Telekom (‘‘DT’’) in the provision of
broadband access to its fixed telecommunications
network.70 DT was considered to be the dominant
supplier of broadband access both at wholesale and
at retail level, and the only operator with a network
of nationwide coverage. DT also accounted for almost 90 per cent of the retail market. Competitors of
DT alleged that its tariffs for line-sharing were so
high that they could not make any profits from
offering the broadband service at retail level. There
was only a tight margin between the line-sharing
69. IP/03/1797, December 19, 2003.
70. IP/04/281, March 1, 2004.

tariff of DT and the end consumer price for broadband service via ADSL, which prevented entry to
the market by new competitors. Line sharing tariffs
were introduced by the German Regulator in March
2002 and it is on that date that DT’s practice allegedly started.
The Commission decided to accept commitments proposed by DT in this case and not to
open formal proceedings. DT committed to stop
charging its competitors monthly line sharing from
April 2004 until the end of 2004 and to substantially
reduce the current line sharing tariffs from the
beginning of 2005. Additionally, DT decided to
increase certain of its retail ADSL tariffs.
German mail rules
In October 2004, the Commission addressed a decision pursuant to Arts 86(3) and 82 EC against
Germany concerning its legal postal regulatory
framework.71 According to certain provisions
thereof, private senders are allowed to feed selfprepared mail directly into Deutsche Post’s sorting
centres and are granted discounts for doing so,
while commercial mail preparation firms are not
given such discounts.
The Commission considered that the respective
provisions induced Deutsche Post, which has the
exclusive rights to distribute letters below 100
grams, to discriminate against commercial sorting
operators, placing them at a considerable competitive disadvantage. Germany was given two months
to inform the Commission of the measures taken to
comply with EC competition law.

Current policy issues
Table 4
— Legal Privilege
* Akzo Nobel:
 Privilege for preparatory material before
approaching counsel
 And for in-house lawyers, members of a
Bar?
— Private actions for damages
* A Green Paper to come; debate launched
— Art.82 EC Guidelines
* Clear work going on:
 How to modernise classic European
Court case-law?
 With a rebuttable presumption for some
effect cases, involving efficiencies?

Legal privilege
There are some interesting signs of possible elaboration of legal privilege. Perhaps not a revolution,
71. IP/04/1254, October 20, 2004.
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but some extension of the scope of the privilege,
resulting from recent court proceedings involving
Akzo Nobel.
In February 2003, the Commission issued a decision ordering Akzo Nobel, Akcros Chemicals and
their subsidiaries to submit to an investigation
under Art.14(3) of Regulation 17. The Commission
carried out an onsite inspection at the companies’
premises, during which a dispute arose between
the Commission officials and company representatives with respect to five documents which the
company claimed to be covered by professional
privilege.
Copies of two of these documents, allegedly
drafted for the purpose of a telephone conversation
with an outside counsel, were placed in a sealed
envelope. The remaining three documents were
simply copied and not treated in any special way.
These contained a series of handwritten notes by
the General Manager of Akcros Chemicals, drafted
during discussions with lower level employees for
the purpose of preparing the sealed documents, as
well as an exchange of emails between the General
Manager of Akcros Chemicals and Akzo Nobel’s
competition law coordinator, who was a member of
the Dutch Bar and also a member of Akzo Nobel’s
legal department employed by Akzo on a permanent basis.
Through applications for interim measures, the
question of the possible privilege applying to these
various documents came before the President of
the CFI, who made a number of interesting observations.71a
First, as regards the ‘‘sealed documents’’, the
President considered that there might be a need to
extend the scope of professional privilege, as defined by the case law, in order to cover also working
or summary documents drafted for the sole purpose
of obtaining the assistance of a lawyer.72 Interestingly that might include the review of facts connected with a current investigation or an investigation
which a company might reasonably fear or anticipate, and where therefore the company might choose
to prepare in defence in advance.73 As regards the
handwritten notes, the President took a similar view.
Secondly, as regards the email exchange with an
in-house counsel admitted to the Dutch Bar, the
judge first noted that the emails were not, in principle, covered by professional privilege on AM&S.73a
However, the President stated that such a rule
might need review since AM&S, especially where
in-house counsel were members of a Bar.74
Thirdly, the President also underlined that legal
privilege is not just about rights of the defence, it is
71a. Joined cases T–125/03R and T–253/03R, October 30,
2003.
72. [102]–[109].
73. [113].
73a. Case 155/79, [1982] E.C.R. 1575.
74. [122].



about the right of every person to consult a lawyer
without constraint.75 This is something which
seems to have been forgotten in recent years where
regulators sometimes see privilege as an abusive
tactic to avoid detection of competition law infringements, rather than a fundamental value and right.
Many are now watching with great interest how
the Court will interpret legal privilege in the main
proceedings, conscious that an internal summary
of external legal advice is already privileged and
that not to allow a company to prepare material for
the purpose of consulting external counsel may be
both counter-productive in undermining genuine
compliance steps and at odds with the fundamental
right just noted. (The President’s actual ruling turns
on the interim nature of his review and the specific
balance of interest in the circumstances and has
been appealed to the ECJ since.)

Private actions for damages
The Commission is now pushing to promote more
private actions to enforce the competition rules,76
although conscious that there have been few damages awards. In practice, such actions are still very
difficult (although there have been some settlements). The Commission has sought a (major) study
on the conditions for claims for damages, prepared
by Ashurst, which has now been published on DG
COMP’s website. There is also a useful article in the
Commission’s Newsletter summarising the related
issues and some of the existing damages awards,
notably in France and Sweden.77 The Commission
states that it envisages a Green Paper to identify
potential ways forward.

Article 82 EC Guidelines
The Commission is also thinking seriously about
modernisation of Art.82 EC enforcement. At the
time of writing, it appears that the Commission
does not plan any discussion draft until the middle
of 2005 at the earliest.
In October 2004, Mr Monti emphasised that, in
this area, the EU position may be driven by different
interpretations and considerations to those in the
United States.
Substantively, there is much discussion about
whether and if so, how to allow the dominant to
compete more, based on efficiency arguments.78
75. [167].
76. See, Mr Monti’s Paper at the IBA meeting in Fiesole
SPEECH/04/403, September 17, 2004.
77. See Woods, Sinclair and Ashton, EC Commission
Competition Policy Newsletter, Summer 2004, pp.31–37.
78. See also Ratliff, ‘‘Abuse of Dominant Position and
Pricing Practices—A Practioner’s Viewpoint’’, EUI Proceedings, Florence (Hart Publishing, June 2003) and available at www.iue.it.
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There is also debate about the extent to which
competitors of the dominant should have equal
opportunities to compete and develop the critical
mass to survive in the market.
There is debate about whether per se rules are
appropriate, although, as noted in the first part of
this paper, at least in the case of loyalty rebates, the
European Court appears to consider such an approach valid, given the market strength of the
dominant. Against this, part of the whole ‘‘modernising’’ process has been to focus on effects. If effects
are not unreasonable in economic terms, should not
a dominant company be allowed to pursue its often
self-created, rather than incumbent successful business? Predictability is also considered key, so that
companies can comply reasonably easily on the
basis of practical tests.
It also appears that the Commission is willing to
allow dominant companies greater use of Art.81(3)
EC.

Areas of specific interest
Table 5
—

Liberal Professions
* Belgian architects fine.
 Recommended minimum fee system.
* Competition Advocacy/Communication.
 Serious drive on blatantly unjustified or
disproportionate restrictions.
 Others may involve more difficult
balancing.
— Energy
* A marathon ‘‘Marathon’’ (where the runner
dropped out long ago?!)
 Entry/exit fee systems and multiple zone
charges.
* Decisions on territorial restrictions
announced.
— Sport/Media
* Packaging of football media rights and a
decision at last!
* Hollywood Studios MFN clauses withdrawn
(mainly).

Liberal professions
Belgian architects fee system
In June 2004, the Commission fined the Belgian
Architects Association e100,000, concluding that
its scale of recommended minimum fees was a
violation of the EC competition rules.79
The recommended prices were considered to
facilitate price co-ordination. In the Commission’s
view, such fees should reflect an architect’s skills,
efficiency, costs and perhaps reputation and should
not be dependent solely on the value of the works or
the price of the entrepreneur. In any event, the
79. IP/04/800, June 24, 2004.



architect should determine the fee independently
ofcompetitorsand in agreement with the clientalone.
The amount of the fine was stated to reflect a
gradual approach by the Commission in fining anticompetitive practices in the professions and also
the fact that the fee scale was abolished in 2003. The
Commission also noted that the French Competition Council prohibited the French Architects’
Association from further elaborating and distributing fee scales in 1997, while the UK Office of Fair
Trading also came to the conclusion that the Royal
Institute of British Architects’ (RIBA) indicative fee
guidance could facilitate collusion.
Commission ‘‘Communication’’
In February 2004, the Commission issued a ‘‘Communication on Competition in Professional Services’’.80 This is a follow-up to the detailed ‘‘Vienna
Study’’ commissioned and published last year, as
well as the related Commission conference.
The Communication is a clear piece of competition advocacy, as the Commission invites professional associations to review the proportionality
of any restrictive practices into which they have
entered, with the threat of NCA or European Commission intervention against unjustified practices,
whether directly against the professions concerned,
or indirectly by ‘‘disallowing’’ or otherwise challenging laws contrary to Arts 10 and 81 EC.81
Clearly the Commission may have a point concerning some of the more blatant, often old practices. However, in many areas this will be a far more
complex debate than the Communication suggests.
On Wouters, it is clear that restrictions may be
justified and outside Art.81(1) EC in specific circumstances, if essential to preserve core values of a
profession. It is also perfectly valid on Arduino to
propose suggested restrictions to public authorities
which, after appropriate review, may choose to
adopt them as their own regulations.
On the other hand, in some circumstances, state
action may be challenged as merely ‘‘facilitating’’
an anti-competitive agreement which is contrary to
Art.81(1) EC and patently disproportionate private
restrictions clearly may fall within Art.81(1) EC.
National competition authorities also have a duty
to disallow such laws on Italian Matches.
However, judging the proportionality of a state
measure can be difficult, especially where the state
overtly wishes to further specific universal (public)
service or quality value considerations.82
It is a little disconcerting to see the Commission
arguing (as occurred after the detailed study last
80. COM (2004) 83 final, available on the Commission’s
website; IP/04/185, February 9, 2004.
81. See also Amato, Collins, De Waele, Paseman, EC
Commission Competition Policy Newsletter, Summer
2004, pp.71–74.
82. See Ratliff, ‘‘EC Competition Law and the Liberal
Professions’’, Paper at IBC London, April 2004.
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year) that just because some Member States take a
very ‘‘liberal’’ approach with one notion of service,
others with more restrictive systems supporting a
different notion of service are necessarily following
disproportionate solutions.
One may also think that there is a middle path, in
which key professional values associated with liberal professions can be reasonably balanced with
competition. However, at the moment the Commission’s advocacy is clearly aimed to push fast for
change, at least as regards those restrictions which
are not reasonable in this sense.

Energy
More ‘‘Marathon’’ settlements
In April 2004, the French and the German gas
companies, Gaz de France and Ruhrgas, offered
commitments to improve third-party access to their
respective networks, thereby settling the Commission’s investigation into their alleged refusal to
grant the Norwegian subsidiary of the US gas producer, Marathon, access to their networks.83
It may be recalled that in April and July 2003
the Commission announced that it had settled with
Gasunie and BEB, having previously settled the
case with Thyssengas in November 2001.84
The commitments by Gaz de France and Ruhrgas, which reflect the market situation in each
country and are therefore not identical, will remain
in force for several years. Their fulfilment will be
monitored by a trustee who is to report to DG
Competition.
The main commitments made by Gaz de France
are:






Gradual reduction in the number of tariff
and balancing zones on which the entry/
exit transport system is based in France.
The idea is to reduce the number of zones
from seven to two by 2009, facilitating access
for new entrants by reducing the cost of
transport connected with the crossing of several zones.
Starting in January 2005, the transport division of Gaz de France will offer operators
the possibility to convert high calorific value
gas into low calorific value gas, thus giving
greater access to gas which can be used to
compete for low calorific gas users (a large
part of the French market).
Starting in January 2005, for three years, Gaz
de France has undertaken to implement a
‘‘gas release programme’’ in southern France,
where there is currently no competition.
83. IP/04/573, April 30, 2004
84. IP/03/547, April 16, 2003, IP/03/1129, July 29, 2003;
[2004] ICCLR 72; IP/01/1641, November 23, 2001; [2003]
I.C.C.L.R. 111.



The main commitments by Ruhrgas are:






There will be a new regime allowing customers to book gas transport capacities separately at entry and exit points, without
booking any capacity between the two points.
Ruhrgas will introduce six tariff zones, which
it will progressively reduce to four by May
2006.
Ruhrgas will extend the new entry/exit regime beyond its own network, to include
other regional transmission companies in
which it holds a majority or minority stake.

In addition to these commitments, Gaz de France
and Ruhrgas will improve transparency, handling
of requests for network access and congestion management. Ruhrgas also promised to introduce the
so-called ‘‘use-it-or-lose-it’’ principle into all its
transport contracts.
Territorial restrictions
In October 2004, the Commission announced that
it had taken two decisions concerning territorial
restrictions in the gas sector.85 They concern two
contracts concluded by Gaz de France in 1997, one
with ENI, and the other with ENEL.
Under a transport contract between GdF and
ENI, GdF transports gas bought by ENI in northern
Europe through French territory to the border with
Switzerland. This contract contained a clause obliging ENI to market the gas only after leaving
France (‘‘downstream of the redelivery point’’).
The contract between GdF and ENEL concerned
swaps of gas purchased by ENEL in Nigeria and
required ENEL to use the gas only in Italy. The
Commission considered that these clauses partitioned national markets by preventing French consumers from being supplied by ENI and ENEL.
The Commission adopted the two decisions,
although the parties had already terminated the
infringements, with a view to clarifying the situation for all undertakings operating in the gas
sector.

Sport and media
UEFA Champions League
In November 2003, the Commission published its
(long awaited) decision in the UEFA Championships League case.86
It may be recalled that the Commission considers
the collective, exclusive sale by UEFA on behalf
of national clubs or football associations of the
broadcasting rights to the final stages of the UEFA
85. IP/04/1310, October 26, 2004.
86. [2003] O.J. L291/25, November 8, 2003. See Toft, EC
Commission Competition Policy Newsletter, Autumn
2003, p.47.

[2005] I.C.C.L.R., ISSUE 3 c SWEET & MAXWELL LIMITED [AND CONTRIBUTORS]

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

126 RATLIFF: MAJOR EVENTS AND POLICY ISSUES IN EC COMPETITION LAW, 2003–2004 (PART 2): [2005] I.C.C.L.R.

Champions League to be a price-fixing agreement
and an output restriction which limits the broadcasting of football.87 Such awards are also considered to distort competition in broadcasting
markets for which football is key content.
In August 2002, however, the Commission published an Art.9(3) Notice, proposing to take a
favourable position on UEFA’s revised commercial
policy under which UEFA would award the television rights following a public invitation to bid to
broadcasters for various packages of media rights.88
In its decision, the Commission distinguished
the following relevant markets:








The upstream markets for the sale and acquisition of free-TV, pay-TV and pay-per-view
rights;
the downstream markets on which television
broadcasters compete for advertising revenue depending on audience rates, and for
pay-TV/pay-per-view subscribers;
the markets for media rights for new media
(wireless/3G/UMTS rights, internet rights
and video-on-demand rights); and
the markets for other commercial rights,
namely sponsorship, ‘‘suppliership’’ and
licensing.

As regards notably the upstream markets for television and pay-per-view rights, the Commission
considered several factors in relation to the special
value of broadcasting rights for football events,
which can be attributed to this sport’s ability to
act as a developer of a brand image of channels and
to attract the most sought-after viewers (i.e. men
with an above average spending power and who are
in the age groups of 16–20 and 35–40).
The Commission then concluded that there existed a separate market for the acquisition of television broadcasting rights to football which is
played regularly throughout every year.89 This definition involved matches in national league and cup
events, as well as the UEFA Champions League and
UEFA Cup.
Interestingly the Commission concluded that:
‘‘... there are no programmes which place a competitive
constraint on the ability of the holder of the TV rights to
football events being played regularly throughout
every year to determine the price of these TV rights.
TV rights to other sports events or other types of
programmes such as feature films do not put a competitive restraint on the holder of the TV rights to such
football events. Including such rights in the market
definition would make the definition too wide. In
other words, there is no substitutability between the
TV rights to football and the TV rights to other programmes.’’90 (Emphasis added).
87. [2003] I.C.C.L.R. at 112.
88. [2002] O.J. C196/3, August 17, 2002; see also IP/02/
806, June 3, 2002.
89. See para.63.
90. See para.77.



The Commission found that the grant by football
clubs to UEFA of the exclusive right to sell jointly
certain commercial rights on behalf of the clubs fell
within Art.81(1) EC, as did the restrictions on the
football clubs selling their commercial rights individually. The Commission noted, however, that
UEFA might be the co-owner of some of the media
rights as a result of its role in organising the League
and UEFA ‘‘brand image’’ (without purporting to
rule on the issue). The Commission then concluded
that an Art.81(3) EC exemption was justified.
Through the joint selling arrangements, a quality
branded content product sold in packages via a
single point of sale was created, thus providing
advantages for media operators, football clubs and
viewers. Media operators and consumers could
receive more efficient and easier access to a unique
content which, in addition, was carrying the UEFA
Champions League brand label.
The joint arrangement not only created efficiencies for media operators, which would be able
to invest in improved production and transmission
technologies, but also allowed viewers to obtain
access to better quality media coverage, enabling
them to watch all premium matches over the course
of the entire season.
The Commission also accepted that the restrictions were indispensable to provide the efficiencies
and improvements leading to consumers benefits,
as long as the joint selling body was able to find
demand for the jointly sold media rights.91
Finally, the Commission accepted that the arrangements did not eliminate competition. The
Commission found that (i) UEFA Champions League rights represented only some 20 per cent of the
relevant market; (ii) the jointly sold media rights
had been split up into packages offered for sale in a
competitive bidding procedure open to all interested media operators; and (iii) both UEFA and the
football clubs sold certain categories of these rights
on a non-exclusive basis.
However, the Commission found that no benefits arose from the restriction on football clubs
selling live television rights to free-TV broadcasters
and subjected its decision to the condition that
football clubs be able to do so where there was no
reasonable offer from any pay-TV broadcaster. The
duration of the exemption was set for two contract
periods with expiry on July 31, 2009.
English FA Premier League
In December 2003, the Commission also announced that it had reached a ‘‘provisional agreement’’ with the English FA Premier League
concerning the joint selling of media rights to
Premier League matches.92

91. See paras 136–180.
92. IP/03/1748, December 16, 2003.
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The League has agreed that after 2006 there
would be at least two television broadcasters of
live League matches. The League would create
‘‘balanced packages’’ of matches ‘‘showcasing’’ the
Premier League as a whole, and no broadcaster
would be allowed to buy all of the packages. The
auctions will be examined by the Commission and
Premier League to ensure that they do not exclude
potential competitors.
BSkyB, which recently acquired the television
rights to Premier League matches, has also agreed to
offer to sub-license a set of up to eight top quality
Premier League matches each season to another
broadcaster (starting next season).
German Bundesliga
In September 2004, the Commission published an
Art.27(4) Notice in relation to the joint selling of
media rights to the German Bundesliga.93 This is
another Regulation 1/2003 development, insofar as
it is a notice indicating that, subject to market
testing, the Commission is planning to take an
Art.9 decision declaring commitments binding,
and inviting comments on such proposed action.
The commitments are summarised in the Official
Journal, but the actual terms are published on the
Commission’s website. Substantively, the commitments fit the same sort of standard pattern as the
UEFA case.
The Commission is concerned that if all the
media rights to the first and second German football
leagues are sold through a central marketing system, then clubs lose the right to sell their rights in
packages and at prices of their own choosing. Moreover, there is concern that obtaining the rights can
have crucial significance to downstream advertising and pay-per-view markets, for which such
content may be important.
As a result, the clubs are authorised to transfer
media rights to the Bundesliga, but these are then
offered to ‘‘exploiters’’ in 10 packages, according to
content and transmission medium (e.g. live, ‘‘near
live’’ and deferred transmission of matches, highlights etc. for free-to-air television, pay-per-view,
internet and mobile phones, etc.). Rights packages
are for a maximum of three seasons and clubs retain
rights to sell home games to free-to-air television
broadcasters and home and away game extracts on
the internet. Unused rights may also be exploited by
the clubs. The Commission has reserved its position should one company acquire several centrallymarketed packages with exclusive rights.
Finally, we should note that in January 2004, the
Commission announced a sectoral investigation in
the sale of sports rights to internet companies and to
providers of third generation mobile phone services, with a view to acquiring comprehensive

93. O.J. C229/13, September 14, 2004.



information on the availability of audiovisual
sports rights in the European Union and on possible
relevant anti-competitive practices that need to be
addressed.94
Hollywood film studios
In October 2004, the Commission closed its investigation into the so-called ‘‘output deals’’ between
six major Hollywood film studios and a number
of pay-television companies in the EU.95 Output
deals, which are common in the Hollywood film
industry, are agreements whereby the studios agree
to sell to broadcasters their entire film productions
for a given period of years.
The Commission objected to so-called ‘‘most
favoured nation’’ clauses which gave the studios
the right to enjoy the most favourable terms agreed
between a pay-TV company and any one of them,
because the Commission considered that the cumulative effect of these clauses distorted price competition. In particular, any increase agreed with one of
these studios would trigger the right to parallel
increases for the prices of other studios.
Six studios have either withdrawn the clause or
waived their related rights. Two studios, NBC Universal and Paramount, have not agreed to withdraw
the clause from their respective contracts.

International
EU-related issues in US courts
Two cases decided in the United States Supreme
Court in June 2004 deserve comment for their
European interest.96
First, in F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v Empagran
SA, the Supreme Court set aside a lower court
ruling under which purchasers that had bought a
cartelised product outside the United States from
non-US sellers could nonetheless sue for treble
damages in the US courts, if the conspiracy had
some effect in the United States. The issue hinged
on the interpretation of the US Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, a statute that was
meant to clarify the extent to which the US antitrust
laws apply to foreign conduct.
The Supreme Court’s ruling cut back on the
scope of recovery for purchasers outside the United
States, but did not wholly close the issue. The Court
said that foreign purchasers could not sue in the
United States when their injury from the cartel is
‘‘independent’’ of the cartel’s effect in the United
States. As might be expected, the question as to

94. IP/04/134, January 30, 2004.
95. IP/04/1314, October 26, 2004.
96. With thanks to Chuck Stark for his assistance. See
further, Antitrust and Competition Law Update, June 2004,
available at wilmerhale.com.
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when foreign and US injuries are ‘‘independent’’ of
one another is now being litigated in the US cases.
Secondly, in Intel Corp v Advanced Micro Devices Inc, the Supreme Court held that US legislation aimed at securing US-located evidence to
assist foreign tribunals, 28 USC s.1782, could be
used by a complainant in a non-US antitrust investigation to obtain discovery from the company
against which it was complaining. AMD, a USbased semiconductor maker, had complained to
the European Commission about conduct by its
rival, Intel, that AMD argued constituted an abuse
of a dominant position by Intel. AMD had asked the
Commission to require Intel to provide the Commission with documents which Intel had produced
in US intellectual property litigation with another
company, but the Commission declined to do so.
AMD then brought an action in a US Federal Court
seeking the Intel documents so that AMD could
give them to the Commission.
The Commission filed an amicus brief arguing
that US discovery should not be available to complainants in Commission investigations. It argued
that it was not a ‘‘tribunal’’ within the meaning of
the US legislation and that allowing such discovery
would interfere with its own proceedings. The
Court nonetheless held that the statute allows discovery in such cases, but noted that it leaves the
District Court with substantial discretion as to
whether or on what terms to allow discovery. The
case was remanded to the District Court, which



then declined to grant AMD’s discovery request
on the grounds, inter alia, that the Commission
had made clear that it did not want the material
and did not welcome the US court’s ‘‘assistance’’.
EU-China and Korea competition dialogues
In May 2004, Mr Monti and the Chinese Commerce
Minister signed an agreement on a ‘‘structured
dialogue’’ on competition between the European
Union and China.97 This agreement is a follow-up to
a declaration signed in November 2003 between the
Commissioner and the ministerial authorities that
are responsible for the drafting of the new Chinese
competition law.98
The agreement constitutes the basis for a formal
dialogue having as its primary objective a ‘‘permanent forum of consultation and transparency’’ between China and the EU in this area.
In October 2004, Mr Monti and the Chairman of
the Korean Fair Trade Commission appear to have
signed a similar Memorandum of Understanding
on a similar ‘‘structured dialogue’’ on competition
between the EU and Korea.99 This Memorandum is
perceived as the basis for a formal dialogue between
the EU and the Republic of Korea which makes
official the existing co-operation practices.

97. IP/04/597, May 6, 2004.
98. IP/03/1587, November 24, 2003.
99. IP/04/1325, October 28, 2004.
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